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Abstract 
We provide evidence suggesting that corporate credit rating changes have an effect on firms’ 
voluntary disclosure behavior that is independent of the information they convey about firm 
fundamentals. Our analyses exploit two separate quasi-experimental settings that generate either 
exogenous credit rating downgrades or credit rating upgrades that allow us to isolate the effect of 
the credit rating label from changes in firms’ credit quality. We find evidence of a negative relation 
between the direction of the credit rating change and the provision of voluntary disclosure in both 
settings—firms respond to exogenous downgrades by increasing voluntary disclosure and to 
exogenous upgrades by decreasing voluntary disclosure. Overall, our analyses indicate that credit 
rating agencies as information intermediaries influence firms’ provision of voluntary disclosure.  
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1. Introduction 
 Many studies have examined the association between quantitative financial disclosures and 
credit ratings (e.g., Kraft, 2015; Basu and Naughton, 2017). A smaller number of studies have 
investigated whether aspects of firms’ qualitative disclosures affect credit ratings (e.g., Bonsall 
and Miller, 2017; Bozanic and Kraft, 2017). The implication of these studies is that firm 
disclosures have a causal effect on credit ratings—holding constant the credit quality of the firm, 
enhanced disclosures can improve the firm’s credit rating. We hypothesize that causality does not 
only go from disclosure to credit ratings. Rather, we posit that in the absence of a change in credit 
quality, a firm may respond to a change in its credit rating label by changing its disclosure 
practices. Thus, the certification role provided by credit rating agencies as information 
intermediaries (e.g., Sufi, 2009) could influence firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior. 
Empirically identifying a causal relation between credit rating labels and corporate 
disclosure is difficult in part due to an omitted variables problem whereby unobservable changes 
in firm fundamentals may jointly affect both credit ratings and corporate disclosure. Our proposed 
solution to this endogeneity problem is to focus on two quasi-experimental settings with credit 
rating changes that are plausibly exogenous to firm fundamentals, thus allowing us to attribute 
changes in voluntary disclosure behavior to changes in credit rating labels rather than changes in 
firm fundamentals. These quasi-experimental settings also mitigate the concern that our results are 
a manifestation of the reverse-casual effect of disclosure on credit ratings documented in prior 
research.  
While the existence of a relation between changes in the firm’s credit rating label and its 
voluntary disclosure behavior could be established with either setting, we use two complementary 
settings because it allows us to provide a more complete picture of how credit rating labels 
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influence disclosure choices. We suggest that the firm may respond to an exogenous credit rating 
change in one of two ways. First, the firm could view the credit rating label to be unimportant 
because interested parties focus on the underlying credit quality of the firm, thus leading to no 
association between changes in the firm’s credit rating label and its provision of voluntary 
disclosure. In contrast, the firm could view the credit rating label as an important public signal 
about the firm’s prospects. In this case, we follow the analytical framework in Penno (1996) and 
suggest that changes in credit rating labels will influence the extent of the firm’s information 
production. More specifically, Penno (1996) predicts that firms will respond to an exogenous credit 
rating downgrade with an increase in voluntary disclosure (a “back-to-the-wall” policy) and to an 
exogenous credit rating upgrade with a reduction in voluntary disclosure (a “don’t-rock-the-boat” 
policy).1 Our use of separate downgrade and upgrade settings allows us to investigate both of these 
disclosure policies. 
Our downgrade setting exploits rating agencies’ sovereign ceiling rule, which generally 
doesn’t allow a firm to have a credit rating higher than its home country (Almeida et al., 2017). 
The implementation of this rule increases the likelihood of a credit rating downgrade for bound 
firms (i.e., those firms with a credit rating at or above the sovereign rating of its home country) in 
response to a sovereign downgrade. For identification, we use a difference-in-differences 
framework that compares the change in voluntary disclosure in response to a sovereign downgrade 
for bound versus non-bound firms. This approach controls for firm fundamentals to the extent that 
bound firms do not experience a greater deterioration in credit quality than non-bound firms in 
response to the sovereign downgrade. Empirically, our data are consistent with this identification                                                         
1 An analytical study of the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model by Acharya, 
DeMarzo and Kremer (2011) generates similar predictions. Their model predicts that bad market news can trigger the 
immediate release of information by firms, consistent with the empirical findings in Sletten (2012). In addition, their 
model also predicts that good market news slows the release of information by firms. 
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strategy. The probability that a firm receives a downgrade during the same period as the sovereign 
downgrade is strongly discontinuous at the sovereign bound, with bound firms experiencing an 
incremental reduction in their credit rating of 0.82 notches relative to non-bound firms. However, 
we do not find a statistically significant difference in the change in CDS spreads for bound versus 
non-bound firms, indicating that the observed difference in rating changes is unlikely to be 
attributable to differential changes in credit quality. 
Our upgrade setting takes advantage of the implementation of Financial Accounting 
Standards Board Statement No. 158 (“SFAS158”), which increases the likelihood of a credit rating 
upgrade for firms with Additional Minimum Liability (“AML”) reporting requirements 
attributable to underfunded defined benefit pension plans (Basu and Naughton, 2017). These credit 
rating upgrades are unrelated to firm fundamentals, and are simply a function of a correction to 
the credit rating process.2 Once again, we use a difference-in-differences framework that compares 
the change in voluntary disclosure after the adoption of SFAS158 for high versus low AML firms. 
As with the sovereign setting, our data indicates that this setting generates differential changes in 
credit ratings without differential changes in credit quality. We find that high AML firms 
experience a statistically significant rating upgrade of 0.27 notches relative to low AML firms. 
However, there is not a statistically significant difference in the change in CDS spreads for high 
versus low AML firms, consistent with the notion that SFAS158 did not differentially affect the 
credit quality of high versus low AML firms. 
                                                        
2 Prior to the implementation of SFAS158, there were potentially two liabilities, the Accrued Pension Cost and the 
Additional Minimum Liability (“AML”). Basu and Naughton (2017) find that the major credit rating agencies were 
only aware of the Accrued Pension Cost, and not the AML. As a result, the credit rating agency adjustments overstated 
the net pension liability by the amount of the AML. SFAS158 eliminated the AML, thus exogenously correcting the 
error in the rating agency adjustments. 
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Across both settings, we find a negative relation between the direction of the credit rating 
change and the provision of voluntary disclosure, which we proxy for using the likelihood and 
frequency of management forecasts. In the sovereign setting, we find that firm-year observations 
subject to the sovereign ceiling increased both the likelihood and frequency of management 
forecasts during sovereign downgrade years. This result is consistent with a “back-to-the-wall” 
policy, whereby the firm exerts effort to respond to and potentially mitigate negative public news 
about the firm. In the SFAS158 setting, we find that firms with AML reporting requirements above 
the median decreased both the likelihood and frequency of management forecasts in response to 
SFAS158. This result is consistent with a “don’t-rock-the-boat” policy, whereby the firm does not 
increase its own information production in response to positive public news.  
The complementary nature of these results is reassuring, because the data employed in each 
setting are substantially different. While the sovereign ceiling rule setting focuses on a small 
number of foreign firms where exogenous rating downgrades are distributed over time, the 
SFAS158 setting uses a large sample of US firms where exogenous rating upgrades are at a single 
point in time. It is also reassuring that the results across both settings are robust to a variety of 
fixed effects specifications,3 and that we find consistent evidence in additional tests that consider 
the firm’s overall information environment and variation in the strength of the negative news. In 
general, the coefficients in our analyses suggest that the effects we document are economically 
meaningful. For example, firms with AML reporting requirements above the median are 15.7 
percent less likely to provide management forecasts during the SFAS158 implementation year. 
                                                        
3 For example, in the sovereign ceiling setting, our results are robust to country-industry-year fixed effects. This 
particular specification implies that within a particular year, a bound firm in the same country and industry as a non-
bound firm increases its provision of voluntary disclosure relative to the non-bound firm in response to a sovereign 
downgrade. 
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We make several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the emerging 
literature that examines how credit rating agencies as information intermediaries shape a firm’s 
disclosure choices. The most closely related paper to ours is Sethuraman (2018), who finds that 
firms increase disclosure during periods where credit rating agency reputations are lower to aid 
investors’ assessment of credit risk. Our study complements Sethuraman (2018) by finding that 
firms also adjust their disclosure policies in response to changes in credit rating labels. More 
broadly, we contribute to the literature that examines how outside forces shape a firm’s disclosure 
choices. Within this broader literature, our results are related to Sletten (2012), who documents an 
increase in management forecasts in response to exogenous stock price declines, as the disclosed 
firm-value-related information withheld prior to the decline became more favorable at the lower 
stock price.  
Our study also relates to prior studies that examine whether improved disclosure has an 
effect on firms’ credit ratings. For example, Bonsall and Miller (2017) find that less readable 
annual reports are associated with less favorable credit ratings and more frequent and larger 
magnitude disagreements about the initial rating of a new bond. Similarly, Bozanic and Kraft 
(2017) find that qualitative disclosures are associated with soft credit rating adjustments, indicating 
that effective disclosures can justify favorable adjustments to credit ratings determined using 
quantitative financial inputs. Our analyses complement these prior studies by providing evidence 
consistent with the reverse causality result that credit rating changes that are unrelated to changes 
in credit quality have an effect on firms’ disclosure practices.  
Lastly, we contribute to the literature that examines the effects of credit ratings. Within this 
literature, prior studies have shown that corporate credit ratings affect a firm's cost of capital 
(Kisgen and Strahan, 2010), its capital structure (Kisgen, 2006), and the level of firm investment 
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(Lemmon and Roberts 2010; Chernenko and Sunderam 2012; Almeida et al., 2017). This literature 
has also shown that credit markets are influenced by the certification role of rating agencies (e.g., 
Sufi, 2009) and that sophisticated investors vary their reliance on credit rating in response to 
changes in the reputation of credit rating agencies (e.g., deHaan, 2017). We add to this literature 
by showing that credit ratings influence the firm’s disclosure policy. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss existing literature and present our 
hypotheses. We then outline the data and sample selection in Section 3. We present our research 
design and results in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Related Research and Hypothesis Development 
We examine the effect of exogenous credit rating changes on firms’ voluntary disclosure 
behavior. Our study is related to recent work that has examined how firms and investors respond 
to variation in the reputation of the credit rating agencies. deHaan (2017) finds that sophisticated 
market participants decrease their reliance on corporate credit ratings after the 2008 global 
financial crisis, consistent with the notion that the perceived usefulness of corporate credit ratings 
declined in response to the reputational consequences of the financial crisis for rating agencies. 
Sethuraman (2018) finds that firms increase voluntary disclosure during periods where the 
reputation of the rating agencies is low, to help investors who are not as willing to rely on the 
credit rating itself to assess the firm’s credit risk. Our study is also related to work that has 
examined whether firm disclosure has an effect on the firm’s credit rating. Bonsall and Miller 
(2017) find that less readable annual reports are associated with less favorable credit ratings and 
Kraft and Bozanic (2017) find evidence suggesting that effective disclosures can justify favorable 
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soft adjustments to firm credit ratings. The implication of these two studies is that firm disclosures 
have a causal effect on credit ratings— more effective disclosures produce higher credit ratings.  
We examine the opposite causal relation to these studies by examining whether exogenous 
credit rating changes affect the provision of voluntary disclosure. Even though prior studies have 
not investigated how credit rating labels influence disclosure choices, there are some closely 
related studies in the debt contracting literature. In particular, Vashishtha (2014) finds that firms 
reduce the provision of management forecasts following covenant violations, as enhanced bank 
monitoring substitutes for shareholder monitoring and hence the need for management forecasts. 
To the extent that covenant violations are contemporaneous with credit rating downgrades or that 
credit rating downgrades otherwise shift control rights to the firm’s creditors (e.g., Manso et al., 
2010; Adelino and Ferreira, 2016), then Vashishtha (2014) predicts that credit rating downgrades 
should reduce the provision of management forecasts, consistent with a positive association 
between the direction of the credit rating change and the provision of management forecasts.  
Beyond the credit rating and debt contracting literatures, there are studies that examine the 
consequences of public signals for the firm’s information production. For example, the analytical 
model in Acharya, DeMarzo and Kremer (2011) predicts that bad market news can trigger the 
immediate release of information by firms, and that good market news slows the release of 
information by firms. Sletten (2012) documents an increase in management forecasts in response 
to exogenous stock price declines, as the favorability of the disclosed news depends, in part, on 
the firm’s stock price. Within this literature, the framework that is most closely aligned with our 
setting is Penno (1996), which examines how the firm’s information production responds to public 
signals about the firm’s future prospects.  There are two potential types of public signals—positive 
and negative. For the negative signal, Penno (1996) finds that firms will adopt a “back-to-the-wall” 
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policy, which means that public signal will be followed by extensive information production. For 
the positive signal, Penno (1996) finds that firms will adopt a “don’t-rock-the-boat” policy, which 
means that the public signal will not be followed by information production.  
The implication of these two policies is that firms will increase the provision of voluntary 
disclosure in response to a negative external signal, but will not increase the provision of voluntary 
disclosure in response to a positive external signal. In our setting, these disclosure policies predict 
that credit rating downgrades (i.e., a negative public signal) will be associated with increases in 
voluntary disclosure. While this prediction is in contrast with Vashishtha (2014), it is consistent 
with Sletten (2012). In addition, these disclosure policies predict that credit rating upgrades (i.e., 
a positive public signal) will not be associated with increases in voluntary disclosure—the level of 
disclosure could remain the same or decrease, but it will not increase. Overall, this discussion 
highlights the uncertainty of predictions based on prior studies. Thus, while the actions of credit 
rating agencies as information intermediaries could have an effect on the firm’s voluntary 
disclosure behavior, we cannot predict the direction of the effect ex ante nor can we predict 
whether it is the same for both credit rating upgrades and credit rating downgrades. Therefore, we 
state our main hypothesis separately for credit rating upgrades and downgrades, and state both in 
null form: 
H1a: Exogenous credit rating downgrades have no effect on firms’ provision of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
H1b: Exogenous credit rating upgrades have no effect on firms’ provision of voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
Any relation between exogenous credit rating changes and firms’ voluntary disclosure 
suggests that credit rating agencies, as information intermediaries, have an effect on firms’ 
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voluntary disclosure behavior. A negative association between the direction of the credit rating 
change and the change in voluntary disclosure is consistent with Penno (1996). 
 
3. Institutional Settings and Sample Selection 
3.1 The Sovereign Ceiling Rule Setting 
The sovereign ceiling rule applies to any highly rated firm domiciled in a downgraded 
country. Therefore, as a starting point, we collect data on all non-US firms with non-missing 
foreign currency long-term issuer credit ratings from the S&P Capital IQ database.  We use the 
foreign currency rating because it is more likely to be tied to the sovereign rating than the local 
currency ratings (Almeida et al., 2017). We follow other studies (e.g., Adelino and Ferreira, 2016) 
and focus on S&P's ratings history over other agencies' history because S&P tends both to be more 
active in making ratings revisions and to lead other agencies in re-rating (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2002). In addition, rating announcements by S&P also seem to convey a greater own-
country stock market impact and seem not to be fully anticipated by the market (Reisen and von 
Maltzan, 1999). 
The initial sample consists of 19,655 firm-years with 2,509 unique firms from fiscal years 
2000 through 2015. We exclude firms from countries that did not experience a sovereign 
downgrade during the 2000 through 2015 period, resulting in 11,494 firm-years with 1,442 unique 
firms. We exclude Japanese firms because management forecasts are considered a mandatory 
disclosure for those firms, financial firms (SIC codes “60-69”), utilities (SIC code “49”), and all 
observations with insufficient requisite data described below. The final sample consists of 2,313 
firm-years with 370 unique firms. 
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The main challenge in using the sovereign ceiling rule setting is the connection between 
the creditworthiness of firms in downgraded countries and the overall credit quality of those 
countries. To address this challenge, we follow Almeida et al. (2017) and adopt an empirical 
strategy that compares firm-years where the credit rating downgrade is more likely to be 
attributable to the sovereign ceiling rule rather than firm fundamentals to other firm-years. More 
specifically, we identify firms as bound by the sovereign ceiling rule if the credit rating of the firm 
is at or above the credit rating of the sovereign in the prior year. For these firm-year observations, 
the variable BOUND takes the value of one. Firm-years where the firm is more likely to be 
downgraded due to the sovereign ceiling are those years where the firm is bound and there is a 
sovereign downgrade. We use the variable DOWNGRADE, which is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of one for the years in which the sovereign downgrades occur, to identify 
downgrade years. In our empirical tests, which we describe in detail in Section 4.1, treatment firm-
years are those where both BOUND and DOWNGRADE are equal to one. The empirical strategy 
is illustrated in Figure 1 for Titan Cement Company. For this Greek firm, there are two firm-years 
(2011 and 2015) where the firm is bound (i.e., the credit rating of the firm is at or above the 
sovereign rating in the prior year) and there is a sovereign downgrade. These are the treatment 
firm-year observations in our analyses. All other years are used as control firm-year observations. 
This research design ensures that we are identifying treatment and control observations 
using ex-ante characteristics. This is preferably to simply identifying ex-post downgraded firms 
and examining the disclosure response of those firms for two reasons. First, construction of the 
sample using ex-ante characteristics provides more assurance that the OLS assumption of random 
sampling is not violated due to sample formation based on ex-post outcomes. Second, an 
examination of downgraded firms would likely provide insights into a slightly different research 
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question. In particular, the likely comparison in that case would be between firms that were 
downgraded for economic reasons and firms that were downgraded for exogenous reasons. As a 
result, we would be providing insights into whether there is a difference in disclosure based on the 
reason for the downgrade rather than providing insights into whether exogenous downgrades 
generate different disclosure practices.  This type of analysis would be complicated by the fact that 
it is not clear how to identify economic versus exogenous downgrades ex-post at the firm level.  
Table 1 Panel A provides the sample composition by country. The bound (non-bound) 
sample consists of 102 (2,211) firm-years with 23 (347) unique firms. Consistent with Almeida et 
al. (2017), this distribution of firms indicates that the vast majority of firms have a credit rating 
that is below the sovereign rating. Almeida et al. (2017) report that 88.2% of firms receive a rating 
below the sovereign, compared with 93.7% in our sample. Within the bound sample, there is a 
sovereign rating downgrade for 35 firm-years. This sample of 35 firm-year observations originates 
from nine countries: Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Sri Lanka and 
Turkey. For the other countries in Table 1, the sovereign rating exceeded the firm credit rating for 
each firm-year observation, and thus none of those firm-year observations were bound by the 
sovereign ceiling rule. While small, our sample of treatment firm-year observations is consistent 
with Almeida et al. (2017) who identify 73 treatment firm-year observations using a sample that 
extends over a longer time period (1990—2013 compared with 2000—2015) and includes utilities 
(SIC code “49”). 
Even though the sovereign ceiling is not an absolute rule, the data indicate that the 
probability that a corporate issuer will obtain a rating downgrade during the same period as the 
sovereign downgrade is discontinuous at the sovereign bound. In Table 1 Panel B, we report the 
percentage of bound versus non-bound firm-year observations in our sample that experience a 
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credit rating upgrade, no change in credit rating, or a credit rating downgrade during a sovereign 
downgrade year. Bound firm-year observations have a 54.3% chance of obtaining a downgrade 
during the year, compared with only 20.6% for non-bound firm-year observations. Conversely, 
bound firm-year observations have only a 2.9% chance of obtaining an upgrade during the year, 
compared with 12.9% for non-bound firm-year observations.4 Overall, Table 1 Panel B shows that 
the credit rating of bound firm-year observations declines by approximately one notch in response 
to a sovereign downgrade (RATING increases from 9.40 to 10.34, where higher values indicate 
lower credit ratings), compared to virtually no change for non-bound firm-year observations. 
To ensure that the observed changes in credit ratings are not accompanied by corresponding 
changes in the credit quality of the firm, we compare changes in the average five-year CDS spread 
across the groups of firms in Table 1 Panel C. The CDS spread is the periodic payment to the seller 
of a CDS contract, who in turn promises to buy the reference bond at its par value when a 
predefined default event occurs. The CDS spread is usually expressed as a percentage (in basis 
points) of the bond’s notional value. By construction, this spread provides a pure measure of the 
default risk of the reference entity and higher values of the CDS spread reflect higher default risk. 
We use five-year CDS spreads because these contracts are the most liquid; thus they provide the 
most reasonable pricing estimate of the default risk for the underlying entity (Micu, Remelona, 
and Woolridge, 2006; Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu, 2009; Ham and Koharki, 2016). The results in Panel 
C indicate that there is not a statistically significant difference in the change in CDS spreads for 
bound versus non-bound firms, suggesting that the observed difference in rating changes is 
unlikely to be driven by changes in credit quality. 
                                                        
4 These results are similar to Almeida et al. (2017) who report that, conditional on a sovereign downgrade, firms whose 
rating is at the sovereign ceiling have a 59% chance of obtaining a rating downgrade within the month, compared to 
only 9% and 4% for firms who are, respectively, one and two notches below the sovereign rating. 
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 For each firm, we obtain financial data from Compustat, stock return data from Datastream, 
management forecast data from RavenPack, analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S, and institutional 
investor data from FactSet LionShares. 5 We use RavenPack rather than I/B/E/S because our 
sample consists of foreign firms, and management forecast data on I/B/E/S is primarily for US 
firms.6 For the RavenPack data, we require that novelty=100 and relevance=100 to ensure that the 
earnings forecast news is strictly for the concerned firm only. A firm is categorized as providing 
management earnings forecast if the RavenPack category is "earnings-estimate", "earnings-
guidance", or "earnings-per-share-guidance." Frequency is the count of forecasts.  
We use the entropy balanced matching technique to match treatment and control 
observations (Hainmueller 2012; McMullin and Schonberger 2017; Shroff, Verdi, and Yost, 2017; 
Bonsall and Miller 2017). In our setting, this matching approach provides another way to reduce 
noise in our estimation that would otherwise be present due to fact that the average treatment 
observation may not be easily comparable to the average control observation. The entropy 
balancing technique preserves the full sample and ensures covariate balance between treatment 
and control observations by re-weighting observations such that the post-weighting mean and 
variance for treatment and control observations are virtually identical along rating controls. This 
approach ensures that our treatment and control samples are similar in credit quality, thus allowing 
us to more comfortably interpret changes in disclosure in response to rating changes in our 
treatment group as arising from the rating change as opposed to inherent and unobservable 
differences in fundamentals across the treatment and control firms. Entropy matching is well suited 
                                                        
5 RavenPack (http://www.ravenpack.com/) is one of the most well known providers of news analytics data. It measures 
the news sentiment and news flow of the global equity market based on all major investable equity securities.  
6 In robustness tests, we use management earnings forecast from S&P’s Capital IQ database (see, e.g., Li and Yang, 
2016) and obtain similar results.  
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to this setting because there is a small number of treatment observations, and these observations 
are not easily matched to a single control firm (Bonsall and Miller, 2017). 
As we discus in more detail in Section 4, our use of a difference-in-differences research 
design provides some assurance that our inferences are robust to broad changes that would be 
expected to affect all the firms in our sample. For example, a deterioration in macroeconomic 
fundamentals could only generate the discontinuity in credit rating changes across treatment and 
control subsamples if credit risk increases for bound firms but not for non-bound firms. Consistent 
with Almeida et al. (2017), we suggest that if there were any differential macro effects, better-
quality firms (the treatment group) should be less affected than poorer-quality firms (the control 
group). Within our differences-in-differences framework, we also employ a variety of fixed effect 
structures, including country-industry-year fixed effects, to provide additional assurance that our 
inferences are not due to correlated omitted variables. These tests are described in more detail in 
Section 4. 
The entropy matching variables are a group of variables that prior research has found to be 
associated with the creditworthiness of the firm. We follow Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014) 
in selecting these variables because the financial statement variables employed in that study are 
comprehensive with regard to prior research and are well suited to analyses over a long time-series. 
The specific entropy matching variables we use are: DEBTCOV (sum of long-term debt and debt 
in current liabilities scaled by EBITDA. If this number is negative, we set it equal to zero), 
NEG_DEBTCOV (indicator variable equals to one if DEBTCOV is negative, and zero otherwise),7 
RENT (rental payments divided by total assets), CASH FLOW (cash and short-term investments                                                         
7 We do not allow DEBTCOV to be negative because large ratios of debt to EBITDA increases default risk while 
small ratios decrease default risk. When EBITDA is negative, the ratio becomes negative, while default risk actually 
increases further. Because we limit DEBTCOV to be positive, we capture the effect of negative values with the binary 
indicator variable NEG_DEBTCOV. 
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divided by total assets), INTCOV (EBITDA divided by net interest paid), PROFIT (EBITDA 
divided by sales), PROFITVOL (standard deviation of PROFIT over the last five years, or at least 
the last two years if data is not available for the last five years), SIZE (log of total assets), 
LEVERAGE (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets), TANGIBILITY 
(net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets), and CAPEX (capital expenditures 
divided by total assets).  
Table 1 Panel D provides the mean and variance of each variable across our bound and 
non-bound subsamples both before and after the entropy matching technique is employed. Pre-
matching, there are modest differences across the two groups of observations. For example, the 
bound group appear to be slightly larger (mean SIZE of 9.313 for the bound group compared with 
9.021 for the non-bound group) and have more property, plant and equipment (mean 
TANGIBILITY of 0.511 for the bound group compared with 0.360 for the non-bound group). 
However, post-matching there are no differences in either the mean or variance of any of the 11 
variables across the two groups of observations. Table 1 Panel E presents the descriptive statistics 
for all variables used in the regression. All explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. The average forecast probability is about 23.7% and the forecast frequency is about 
28% in our final sample. 
3.2 The SFAS158 Setting 
The second setting we employ is the implementation of SFAS158, which generated 
exogenous improvements in credit ratings for firms with additional minimum liability reporting 
requirements under the prior accounting regime (Basu and Naughton, 2017). Prior to the 
implementation of SFAS158, there were potentially two liabilities, the Accrued Pension Cost and 
the Additional Minimum Liability (“AML”). The latter liability only exists for firms with pension 
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plans that are underfunded on an accrued basis. Basu and Naughton (2017) find that the major 
credit rating agencies were only aware of the Accrued Pension Cost, and not the AML. As a result, 
the credit rating agency adjustments overstated the net pension liability by the amount of the AML. 
SFAS158 eliminated the AML, thus automatically correcting the error in the rating agency 
adjustments. Basu and Naughton (2017) note that neither S&P nor Moody’s was aware of this 
error, nor did either agency examine changes in credit ratings for firms affected by SFAS158 which 
would have potentially shed light on the error. 
For this setting, we start with all US firms with non-missing long-term issuer credit ratings 
in the S&P Capital IQ database for the period 2004 to 2007. We merge these firms with the 
Fundamental File and Pension Item in Compustat. We eliminate firms that do not have pension 
plans, as our empirical approach relies on the magnitude of the AML, which is an accounting item 
that only exists for firms with pension plans. We also want to ensure that our treatment and control 
firms are similar, and we believe this objective is best achieved by focusing on firms with pension 
plans. We exclude all financial institutions (SIC codes “60-69”), utilities (SIC codes “49”), and 
governmental enterprises (SIC codes that begin with “9”). The resulting sample consists of 5,076 
firm-quarters from 346 unique firms, all of which sponsor a pension plan. Table 2 Panel A provides 
the industry composition for the sample.  
We use this setting to test the effect of credit ratings on disclosure by exploiting the fact 
that the correction to the rating process generated by SFAS158 is exogenous to firm fundamentals, 
and the probability that a corporate issuer will obtain a rating upgrade following the 
implementation of SFAS158 is discontinuous based on the size of the AML reporting requirement. 
Our treatment firms are those with an AML above the median for all the firms in our sample 
(HIGHAML=1) and the remaining firms are the control firms (LOWAML=1). Across these two 
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groups of firms, our data indicates that there is a significant difference in how credit ratings 
responded in the year SFAS158 was effective. In Table 2 Panel B, we report the percentage of 
HIGHAML and LOWAML firms in our sample that experience a credit rating upgrade, no change 
in credit rating, or a credit rating downgrade during a sovereign downgrade year. HIGHAML firms 
have a 28.4% chance of obtaining an upgrade during the year, compared with only 22.9% for 
LOWAML firms. Conversely, HIGHAML firms have only a 29.5% chance of obtaining a 
downgrade during the year, compared with 35.3% for LOWAML firms. Overall, Table 2 Panel B 
shows that the credit rating of HIGHAML firms relative to LOWAML firms increases by 
approximately one-third of a notch in response to SFAS158. Importantly, the analyses of the CDS 
spreads in Panel C indicate that even though there is a difference with regard to changes in credit 
ratings, there is no difference- with regard to changes in CDS spreads and hence credit quality.  
As with the sovereign ceiling rule setting, we ensure that there is balance across the 
treatment and control subsamples by using the entropy matching procedure. We use the same 
variables to capture the credit worthiness of the firm as we did for the sovereign ceiling rule setting 
in Section 3.1. The results of the entropy matching procedure are provided in Table 2 Panel D. 
Pre-matching, there are visible differences in DEBTCOV, INTCOV, PROFITVOL, and 
TANGIBILITY. These differences indicate that the treatment firms have, on average, higher debt, 
lower interest coverage on debt, more volatile profits, and fewer tangible assets. The entropy 
matching procedure eliminated these differences, thus providing some comfort that our subsequent 
analyses are not influenced by inherent differences in the credit worthiness of the treatment and 
control subsamples. Table 2 Panel E presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the 
regression. All explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  
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4. Research Design and Results 
4.1 The Sovereign Ceilings Rule Setting 
We examine the effect of credit ratings on disclosure in the sovereign ceiling rule setting 
using the following difference-in-differences specification: 
VOL_DISCi,t = α + β1BOUNDi,t + β2DOWNGRADEt + β3BOUND*DOWNGRADEi,t +  
∑γj Controls + Fixed Effects + εi,t     (1)  
We proxy for voluntary disclosure using the provision of management forecasts for two 
reasons. First, there is an extensive prior literature that provides evidence suggesting that 
management forecasts represent broad disclosure events that facilitate the monitoring of the firm 
(e.g., Ruland, Tung, and George, 1990; Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005). Second, the amount of private information revealed by managers through earnings 
forecasts is economically large. For example, Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) note that, on 
average, management forecasts account for 16% of the variation in quarterly stock returns. In 
addition, credit markets react significantly to management forecast news as evidenced by credit 
default swap (CDS) spreads (e.g., Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, 2011).  
We use two different variables to proxy for voluntary disclosure behavior: FORECAST and 
FREQUENCY. FORECAST is an indicator variable set to one if the firm issues at least one 
management earnings forecast during the fiscal year. FREQUENCY is the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of times management issues earnings forecast during the fiscal year. We use the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of forecasts to calculate FREQUNCY because the 
distribution of forecasts is skewed. BOUND is an indicator variable that takes the value one for 
firm-years where the firm’s rating is equal to or above the sovereign rating in the prior year. This 
variable identifies those firms where the probability of downgrade is substantially higher than other 
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firms in the event of a sovereign downgrade. DOWNGRADE is an indicator variable that takes the 
value one for all country-years if the country experiences a sovereign ratings downgrade during 
the year.  
We control for various factors identified in prior research as determinants of voluntary 
disclosure behavior (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Li and Yang, 2016). These control variables 
are: BTM (the ratio of book value of equity divided by market value of equity); SURPRISE (the 
absolute change in earnings per share scaled by beginning price per share); RETVOL (the annual 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns); RETURN (the annual buy-and-hold return); ROA 
(the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets); ACCRUALS (which 
equals discretionary accruals calculated based on modified Jones model); ANALYST (the number 
of analysts providing an EPS forecast each month averaged over the entire fiscal year); and 
INSTOWNERSHIP (the percentage of stock held by institutional investors). We also include each 
of the variables used in the entropy matching procedure as controls to absorb residual variation not 
captured by the matching process. We include either country and industry fixed effects or firm 
fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved correlated variables. We also include year-
fixed effects to capture the influence of aggregate time-series trend. Finally, we include country-
industry-year fixed effects so that the effect is attributable only to variation within a given country-
industry-year. We cluster all the standard errors by country-industry groups to account for any 
correlation structure among similar firms (i.e., firms in the same industry) in a given country over 
the entire sample period. 
The coefficient of interest in equation (1) is β3, the coefficient on the interaction term 
BOUND*DOWNGRADE, which captures the change in voluntary disclosure behavior across the 
treatment firm-years (i.e., high probability of a downgrade in response to the sovereign ratings 
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downgrade) and control firm-years (i.e., low probability of a downgrade). To the extent that an 
exogenous credit rating decline leads to a decrease (increase) in the provision of management 
forecasts, we expect β3 < 0 (β3 > 0).  
We present our results using an OLS specification for both continuous as well as binary 
outcome variables for three reasons. First, nonlinear models tend to produce biased estimates in 
panel data sets with a short time series and many fixed effects, leading to an incidental parameters 
problem and inconsistent estimates. Second, nonlinear fixed effects models generate biased 
estimates for interaction terms, which are the main coefficients of interest in our study (see e.g., 
Duchin and Sosyura, 2014). Lastly, it is straightforward to interpret the economic magnitude of 
the coefficients in an OLS specification when the variables of interest are binary variables. In 
robustness tests, we confirm that our conclusions are the same when we use a logit (for the 
FORECAST specification) and ordered logit (for the FREQUENCY specification) model instead 
of OLS. 
The results from equation (1) are presented in Table 3. Panel A provides the univariate 
results and Panel B provides the multivariate results. In Panel A, we separate the firm-year 
observations in our sample into two groups: bound and non-bound. Because of the sovereign 
ceiling rule, the observations in the bound group have a substantially higher probability of 
downgrade in the event of a sovereign ratings downgrade relative to the other observations. We 
further separate the bound and non-bound observations into sovereign downgrade (non-
downgrade) years based on whether the country experienced a sovereign ratings downgrade. We 
then compare, across each of these two groups, whether there are differences in voluntary 
disclosure behavior between downgrade and non-downgrade years. The results in Panel A indicate 
that there was an increase in both the likelihood and frequency of management forecasts for firms 
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subject to the sovereign ceiling in downgrade years when compared with non-downgrade years. 
For example, in the FORECAST specification, there was a statistically significant increase for the 
bound firm-years of 18.0 percent. Similarly, in the FREQUENCY specification, there was a 
statistically significant increase for the bound group of 27.8 percent.8 In contrast, there was no 
measurable change in either specification for the non-bound group. Most importantly, the 
difference-in-differences estimator is positive and highly significant in both specifications.  
The multivariate results in Panel B also show that the bound group increased both the 
likelihood and frequency of management forecasts during sovereign downgrade years. In columns 
(1) and (2), we estimate the effect on FORECAST and FREQUENCY using a specification that 
includes country, industry and year fixed effects. Across the two columns, the coefficient on the 
BOUND*DOWNGRADE interaction term is significantly positive, indicating that firms that are 
more likely to experience exogenous credit rating downgrades respond by providing management 
forecasts or by increasing the frequency of management forecasts. These coefficients are also 
economically meaningful. For example, the coefficient in Column (1) of 0.182 indicates that bound 
firm-years are 18.2 percent more likely to provide management forecasts during sovereign 
downgrade years when compared to other firm-year observations. In columns (3) and (4), we 
replace the country and industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects and obtain results similar to 
those in columns (1) and (2), albeit weaker magnitude. These results indicate that, holding the firm 
constant, there is a statistically significant increase in voluntary disclosure during sovereign 
downgrade years only for the bound group. In columns (5) and (6), we use country-industry-year 
fixed effects so that the effect is attributable only to variation within a given country-industry-year 
and obtain economically strong and statistically significant results in this most restrictive model.                                                         
8 More precisely, because we use the natural logarithm of one plus the number of forecasts, the difference in logs 
represents an approximate percentage change in one plus the number of forecasts.  
22   
For example, the coefficient in Column (5) of 0.452 indicates that bound firm-years are 45.2 
percent more likely to provide management forecasts during sovereign downgrade years when 
compared to other firm-year observations. 
Overall, these results indicate that a credit rating decline unrelated to firm fundamentals is 
associated with an increase in voluntary disclosure, thus providing evidence that credit rating 
agencies, as information intermediaries, have an effect on firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior. 
The direction of the association is consistent with Penno (1996), which predicts a negative 
association between the direction of the credit rating change and the change in voluntary disclosure 
behavior. Next, we examine the nature of the relation between credit rating changes and voluntary 
disclosure in the context of exogenous rating upgrades, thus providing a more complete picture of 
the relation between credit rating changes and voluntary disclosure. 
4.2 The SFAS158 Setting 
We examine the effect of credit ratings on disclosure in the SFAS158 setting using the 
following difference-in-differences specification: 
VOL_DISCi,t = α + β1HIGHAMLi,t + β2HIGHAML*POSTi,t +  
∑γj Controls + Fixed Effects + εi,t     (2) 
HIGHAML is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms whose average 
additional minimum liability scaled by total assets pre-SFAS158 is above the median of the firms 
in our sample. This variable identifies those firms where the probability of an upgrade generated 
by the rating agency correction is highest (Basu and Naughton, 2017). POST is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one for firm-quarters after the implementation of SFAS158 (i.e., 
calendar year 2007).  
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Our remaining research design choices mirror those used in equation (1). We use two 
different variables to proxy for voluntary disclosure behavior: FORECAST and FREQUENCY. We 
use the same set of control variables included in equation (1) as determinants of disclosure 
behavior as well as all the same entropy matching variables. In addition, we include 
PENSIONSIZE, measured as pension assets scaled by total assets, as a control variable to ensure 
that our inferences are robust to potential differences in the size of the pension plan across 
HIGHAML and LOWAML firms. We include industry fixed effects or firm fixed effects to control 
for time-invariant unobserved correlated variables and year- and quarter- fixed effects to capture 
the influence of aggregate time-series trend. The main effect for POST is suppressed due to the 
inclusion of year fixed effects. 
The coefficient of interest in equation (1) is β2, the coefficient on the interaction term 
HIGHAML*POST. This coefficient captures the difference in the change in voluntary disclosure 
behavior between the treatment firms (i.e., those firms with a higher probability of a rating upgrade 
in response to the SFAS158) and the control firms (i.e., those firms with a lower probability of a 
rating upgrade in response to the SFAS158). To the extent that an exogenous credit rating upgrade 
leads to a decrease (increase) in the provision of management forecasts, we expect β2< 0 (β2 > 0).  
The results from equation (2) are presented in Table 4. Panel A provides the univariate 
results and Panel B provides the multivariate results. In Panel A, we separate the firms in our 
sample into two groups: HIGHAML and LOWAML. Within these two groups of firms, we separate 
firm-year observations into pre- and post-SFAS158. We then compare, across each of the 
HIGHAML and LOWAML groups of firms, how the provision of management forecasts changes 
with the implementation of SFAS158. The results in Panel A indicate that HIGHAML firms 
experienced a statistically significant decline in both the likelihood and frequency of management 
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forecasts. In contrast, there was no statistically significant change in either the likelihood or 
frequency of management forecasts for LOWAML firms. Most important, the difference-in- 
differences estimate is significantly negative in both specifications. 
The results in Panel A are also economically meaningful. For example, in the FORECAST 
specification, there was a statistically significant decline for HIGHAML relative to LOWAML firms 
of 8.0 percent. Similarly, in the FREQUENCY specification, there was a statistically significant 
decline for HIGHAML relative to LOWAML firms of 16.4 percent.9 The fact that the economic 
magnitude of these coefficients is less than those in the sovereign ceiling rule setting is reassuring, 
as prior research has found that the market response to credit rating downgrades is typically 
stronger than the response to credit rating upgrades (e.g., Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). In addition, 
our descriptive results showed that change in the average credit rating of the treatment firm-year 
observations was greater in the sovereign ceiling rule setting relative to the SFAS158 setting. 
Finally, as was the case in Table 3, the univariate results suggest that the variation in disclosure 
behavior is attributable to changes for firms subject to the exogenous change in its credit rating 
(i.e., the HIGHAML firms).  
The multivariate results in Panel B also show that HIGHAML firms decreased both the 
provision of and frequency of management forecasts post-SFAS158. In columns (1) and (2), we 
estimate the effect on FORECAST and FREQUENCY using a specification that includes industry 
and year fixed effects. In columns (3) and (4), we replace the industry fixed effects with firm fixed 
effects. Across each of the four columns, the coefficient on the HIGHAML*POST interaction term 
is significantly negative, indicating that firms respond to credit rating upgrades that are unrelated 
to firm fundamentals by reducing the likelihood and frequency of management forecasts. These                                                         
9 More precisely, because we use the natural logarithm of one plus the number of forecasts, the difference in logs 
represents an approximate percentage change in one plus the number of forecasts.  
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coefficients are also economically meaningful. For example, the coefficient on the interaction term 
in Column (1) of 0.116 indicates that there is a decline in the provision of management forecasts 
for HIGHAML firms that is 11.6 percent less than the change in the provision of management 
forecasts for LOWAML firms in response to SFAS158. HIGHAML is suppressed in columns (3) 
and (4) when we include firm fixed effects, as that variable is constant over time for each firm. 
The results in columns (3) and (4) are consistent with those in columns (1) and (2), albeit weaker 
magnitude. Holding constant the firm, we find that HIGHAML firms reduce the likelihood and 
frequency of management forecasts post-SFAS158 relative to LOWAML firms. In economic terms, 
the additional decline in the provision of management forecasts is 7.4 percent and the decline in 
the frequency of management forecasts is 10.3 percent.  
Overall, these results indicate that a credit rating upgrade is associated with a decrease in 
voluntary disclosure, which mirrors our previous result that a credit rating downgrade is associated 
with an increase in voluntary disclosure. Therefore, both the sovereign ceiling rule and the 
SFAS158 settings document a negative association between the direction of the credit rating 
change and the change in voluntary disclosure behavior. These findings suggest that both the 
“back-to-the-wall” and “don’t-rock-the-boat” policies seem to describe how the firm responds to 
exogenous credit rating changes, with the former explaining the increase in disclosure in response 
to downgrades and the latter explaining the decrease in disclosure in response to upgrades. 
Collectively, our results across both settings provide strong evidence that credit rating agencies 
influence firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior. 
4.3 Additional Analyses  
We conduct two sets of cross-sectional tests to provide some additional evidence consistent 
with the conclusions we draw from our main analyses. First, we examine whether the firm’s 
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information environment influences how it responses to the exogenous change in its credit rating. 
For the “back-to-the-wall” policy, Penno (1996) predicts that the increase in the firm’s information 
production is accentuated for firms with worse information environments. The intuition for this 
prediction is that firms have to do more to respond to exogenous negative news when there is more 
uncertainty about the firm’s prospects. Similarly, in the upgrade setting, firms with worse 
information environments adopting a “don’t-rock-the-boat” policy are more likely to curtail 
disclosures so as not to distract from the external positive signal. In an extreme setting where there 
is perfect transparency, neither the “back-to-the-wall” nor the “don’t-rock-the-boat” policies 
would exist. Empirically, we examine this cross-sectional conjecture using Size (measured as the 
natural log of the firm’s Market Cap) to proxy for the firms’ information environment. We 
implement these tests by adding this cross-sectional variable to equations (1) and (2). The results 
are presented in Table 5. 
The analysis using the sovereign setting are provided in Panel A, and the analysis using the 
SFAS158 setting are provided in Panel B. For ease of display, we have not presented the 
coefficients for the main effects, 2-way interaction, the matching variables or the control variables. 
For the sovereign setting, the coefficient on the triple interaction term, 
BOUND*DOWNGRADE*SMALL, is significantly positive in each column, with magnitudes that 
are substantially higher than those in our main specification in Table 3 Panel B. In contrast, the 
coefficients on the triple interaction term, BOUND*DOWNGRADE*BIG, are not statistically 
significant in columns (1) through (4), and are of much lower magnitude in each column. For 
example, Column (1) indicates that FORECAST increases by 35.7 percent for the subset of bound 
firm-years where the bound firm has a market capitalization above the sample median, whereas 
there is no statistically significant change for the observations below the sample median. Tests of 
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the difference in the coefficients across BIG versus SMALL firms had statistically significant p-
values in columns (1), (3), (5) and (6). As expected, the analysis of the SFAS158 setting in Panel 
B does not generate similarly stark differences. While the coefficients on the triple interaction 
term, BOUND*DOWNGRADE*SMALL, are significantly negative, these coefficients are not 
statistically different to the coefficients on the triple interaction term, 
BOUND*DOWNGRADE*BIG.  
Second, we examine whether the relevance of the public news influences the firm’s 
response. In particular, since an exogenous rating downgrade could be more material for firms that 
are financially constrained, we examine whether the results in the sovereign setting are attributable 
to the subset of firms that are more financially constrained. As with the prior analysis, we 
implement these tests by adding this cross-sectional variable to equation (1). We use two different 
cross-sectional variables, both of which are proxies for financial constraints. The first cross-
sectional variable is a binary variable that partitions the sample based on the firm’s level of free 
cash flows (operating cash flows less capital expenditures scaled by total assets) for the year prior 
to the sovereign ratings downgrade. LOWFCF (HIGHFCF) indicates firm-years with free cash 
flows below (above) the sample median. The second cross-sectional variable is a binary variable 
that partitions the sample based on the firm’s KZ Index, developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Companies with a higher KZ-Index scores are more likely to experience difficulties when financial 
conditions tighten since they may have difficulty financing their ongoing operations. HIGHKZ 
(LOWKZ) indicates firm-years with the value of the KZ index above (below) the sample median. 
The analyses using both of these cross-sectional variables is presented in Table 6. The free 
cash flow partition is provided in Panel A. Once again, for ease of display, we have not presented 
the coefficients for the main effects, 2-way interaction, the matching variables or the control 
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variables. The coefficient on the triple interaction term, BOUND*DOWNGRADE*LOWFCF, is 
significantly positive in each column, with magnitudes that are substantially higher than those in 
our main specification in Table 3 Panel B. In contrast, the coefficients on the triple interaction 
term, BOUND*DOWNGRADE*HIGHFCF, are not statistically significant, and of much lower 
magnitude. For example, Column (1) indicates that FORECAST increases by 30.7 percent for the 
subset of bound firm-years with lower free cash flow during downgrade years, whereas there is no 
statistically significant change for the subset of bound firm-years with higher lower free cash flow 
(coefficient of 0.133, which corresponds to 13.3 percent increase in economic terms, and a t-
statistic of 1.026). In general, these tests do not find that there is a statistically significant difference 
in the coefficients across the LOWFCF and HIGHFCF triple interaction terms. Therefore, we 
cannot claim that the effect of a credit rating downgrade is stronger for LOWFCF firms.  
We find similar results for the KZ index cross-sectional test in Panel B. The coefficient on 
the triple interaction term, BOUND*DOWNGRADE*HIGHKZ, is significantly positive in each 
column, with magnitudes that are substantially higher than those in our main specification in Table 
3 Panel B. For example, Column (1) indicates that FORECAST increases by 33.9 percent for the 
bound sample that have a higher KZ index during the sovereign downgrade year. In contrast, the 
coefficients on the triple interaction term, BOUND*DOWNGRADE*LOWKZ, are not statistically 
significant, and of much lower magnitude.  As with our prior analyses, these tests do not 
consistently find that there is a statistically significant difference in the coefficients across the 
HIGHKZ and LOWKZ triple interaction terms. The p-values are statistically significant in columns 
(1) and (3), but not in the other specifications. Therefore, we cannot convincingly claim that the 
effect of a credit rating downgrade is stronger for HIGHKZ firms. 
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Overall, the results in Table 5 and Table 6 provide some insights into the drivers of firms’ 
disclosure choices. In Table 5, the decline in disclosure in response to a credit rating downgrade 
is primarily attributable to those firms that have poor information environments. Similarly, in 
Table 6, the decline in disclosure in response to a credit rating downgrade is primarily attributable 
to those firms that are financially constrained, and hence those firms where an exogenous credit 
rating downgrade is potentially more salient.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We find a negative association between the direction of the credit rating change and the 
likelihood and frequency of management forecasts. We find consistent results across two very 
different settings—the sovereign ceiling rule setting focuses on a small sample of foreign firms 
and rating downgrades, whereas the SFAS158 setting focuses on a large sample of US firms and 
rating upgrades. Overall, our findings suggest that credit rating agencies influence firms’ voluntary 
disclosure behavior. 
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APPENDIX A: Variable Descriptions and Data Sources 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
Voluntary Disclosure Variables 
FORECAST 
Indicator variable set to one for firm-years or firm-quarters where the firm 
issues at least one management earnings forecast during the fiscal year or 
fiscal quarter 
RavenPack, 
I/B/E/S 
FREQUENCY  Natural logarithm of one plus the number of times management issues earnings forecast during the fiscal year or fiscal quarter 
RavenPack, 
I/B/E/S 
Treatment and Cross-sectional Variables 
BOUND Indicator variable set to one for firm-years where the firm’s rating is equal to or above the sovereign rating in the prior year S&P 
DOWNGRADE Indicator variable set to one for firm-years where the country experiences a sovereign rating downgrade  S&P 
HIGH(LOW)AML 
Indicator variable set to one for firms where the size of the firm’s 
Additional Minimum Liability adjustment pre-SFAS158 is above (below) 
the sample median (see Basu and Naughton, 2017) 
Constructed  
POST Indicator variable set to one for firm-quarters post-SFAS158  Constructed 
HIGH(LOW)FCF 
Indicator variables set to one for firm-years or firm-quarters where free 
cash flow is above (below) the sample median; free cash flows is defined 
as operating cash flows less capital expenditures scaled by total assets 
Constructed 
HIGH(LOW)SA 
Indicator variables set to one for firm-years or firm-quarters where the SA 
index is above (below) the sample median; the SA index is defined as –
0.737*SIZE + 0.043*SIZE2 – 0.040*AGE (see Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) 
Constructed 
Entropy Balanced Matching Variables  
SIZE Log of total assets Compustat 
LEVERAGE Sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets  Compustat 
CASHFLOW Operating cash flow scaled by total assets Compustat 
DEBTCOV Sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by EBITDA, or zero if the ratio is negative Compustat 
NEG_DEBTCOV Indicator variable set to one if the DEBTCOV ratio is negative Compustat 
INTCOV EBITDA scaled by net interest paid Compustat 
PROFIT EBITDA scaled by sales  Compustat 
PROFITVOL Standard deviation of PROFIT over the last ﬁve years or quarters, or at least the last two years or quarters if insufficient data Compustat 
TANGIBILITY Net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets Compustat 
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by total assets  Compustat 
RENT Rental payments scaled by total assets Compustat 
PENSIONSIZE Pension assets scaled by total assets  Compustat   
   34 
Other Control Variables 
BTM Ratio of book value of equity divided by market value of equity Compustat 
SURPRISE The absolute change in earnings per share scaled by beginning price per share Compustat 
RETVOL Annual or quarterly standard deviation of monthly stock returns  Datastream, CRSP 
RETURN Annual or quarterly buy-and-hold return Datastream, CRSP 
ROA Ratio of earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets Compustat 
ACCRUALS Discretionary accruals calculated based on the modified Jones model Compustat 
ANALYST Number of analysts providing an EPS forecast each month averaged over the entire fiscal year or fiscal quarter I/B/E/S 
INSTOWNERSHIP Percentage of shares held by institutional investors Worldscope 
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Figure 1: Illustrative Coding for the Sovereign Ceiling Rule Setting  
 
Country:  Greece 
Firm:  Titan Cement Company  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sovereign rating  A A BBB+ BB+ CC B- B- B CCC+ 
Firm rating  BBB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB- BB- BB BB BB 
Bound (firm-year) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Downgrade (country-year) 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Bound * Downgrade 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Guide 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Frequency 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the coding and our identification strategy for the sovereign ceiling rule setting using Titan Cement 
Company in Greece.  We use the sovereign rating and firm’s foreign currency long-term issuer credit rating from S&P.  
Bound is an indicator variable set to one for firm-years where the firm’s rating is equal to or above the sovereign rating in 
the prior year. Downgrade is an indicator variable set to one for country-years where the country experiences a sovereign 
rating downgrade. Bound*Downgrade identifies the average effect of the treatment on the treated. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Sovereign Ceiling Rule Setting 
Panel A: Sample Composition by Country 
  Bound Sample  Non-bound Sample  Total 
Country Sovereign Rating Downgrade Years 
Unique 
Firms 
Downgrade 
Firm- 
Years 
Non-
downgrade 
Firm-Years  
Unique 
Firms 
Downgrade 
Firm- 
Years 
Non-
downgrade 
Firm-Years 
 
Unique 
Firms 
Firm- 
Years 
Argentina 2000;2001;2008;2012 2 4 12  0 0 0  2 16 
Austria 2012 0 0 0  5 3 29  5 32 
Belgium 2011 0 0 0  6 4 36  6 40 
Brazil 2002;2014;2015 4 4 18  30 48 140  35 210 
Bulgaria 2014 0 0 0  1 1 1  1 2 
Chile 2015 0 0 0  15 11 67  15 78 
Cyprus 2012 0 0 0  1 1 3  1 4 
Czech Republic 2002;2004 0 0 0  1 2 11  1 13 
Egypt 2001 0 0 0  1 0 3  1 3 
Finland 2014 0 0 0  7 6 78  7 84 
France 2012;2013 0 0 0  48 73 352  48 425 
Greece 2004;2009;2010;2011;2015 5 7 11  2 5 6  7 29 
Hungary 2002;2005;2006;2008;2009;2011;2012 2 2 3  3 8 5  5 18 
India 2001;2002 0 0 0  13 1 82  13 83 
Indonesia 2001 0 0 0  27 3 130  27 133 
Ireland 2009;2010;2011 0 0 0  7 9 35  7 44 
Israel 2002;2013 0 0 0  3 2 15  3 17 
Italy 2004;2006;2011;2012;2013;2014 4 11 11  11 32 34  15 88 
Kazakhstan 2007;2015 0 0 0  3 2 10  3 12 
Malaysia 2011 0 0 0  7 4 47  7 51 
Mexico 2009;2011 0 0 0  28 24 163  28 187 
Mongolia 2014;2015 0 0 0  1 1 1  1 2 
Netherlands 2013 0 0 0  25 14 197  25 211 
New Zealand 2011 0 0 0  7 3 48  7 51 
   37 
  Bound Sample  Non-bound Sample  Total 
Country Sovereign Rating Downgrade Years 
Unique 
Firms 
Downgrade 
Firm- 
Years 
Non-
downgrade 
Firm-Years  
Unique 
Firms 
Downgrade 
Firm- 
Years 
Non-
downgrade 
Firm-Years 
 
Unique 
Firms 
Firm- 
Years 
Oman 2015 0 0 0  1 1 1  1 2 
Philippines 2003;2004;2005 0 0 0  4 5 11  4 16 
Poland 2002;2003 0 0 0  7 4 33  7 37 
Portugal 2005;2009;2010;2011;2012 2 2 2  3 8 9  5 21 
Russia 2008;2014;2015 2 2 0  25 32 59  27 93 
Saudi Arabia 2015 0 0 0  1 1 6  1 7 
South Africa 2011;2012;2014 0 0 0  5 10 18  5 28 
Spain 2009;2010;2011;2012 0 0 0  14 16 41  14 57 
Sri Lanka 2008;2012 1 2 8  1 0 1  1 11 
Taiwan 2002 0 0 0  17 2 79  17 81 
Thailand 2009 0 0 0  8 6 67  8 73 
Turkey 2001;2015 1 1 2  9 8 43  10 54 
Total  23 35 67  347 350    1,861  370 2,313 
(continued) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Ex-post Changes in Credit Ratings 
 Long-term Credit Ratings 
  Pre-Downgrade Year Downgrade Year  
  (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
Bound (i) 
9.16 10.34 1.18*** 
N=25 N=35  
Non-bound (ii) 
10.28 10.64 0.36*** 
N=319 N=350  
 (i)-(ii) 1.12 0.35 0.82* 
 
    
 % (Count) Of firms that experienced credit ratings changes in the sovereign downgrade year  
  # Upgrades # No Change # Downgrades 
  (a) (b) (c) 
Bound (i) 
2.3% 45.7% 51.4% 
N=1 N=16 N=18 
Non-bound (ii) 
12.9% 66.6% 20.6% 
N=45 N=233 N=72 
      
 
Panel C: Ex-post Changes in CDS Spreads (Unweighted) 
 5-Year CDS Spreads 
  Pre-Downgrade Year Downgrade Year  
  (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
Bound (i) 
1.36 1.32 -0.04 
N=10 N=10  
Non-bound (ii) 
2.54 2.41 -0.13 
N=110 N=103  
 (i)-(ii) 1.18** 1.09* 0.09 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel D: Entropy Balanced Matching  
 Pre-Matching  Post-Matching 
 Bound Mean 
Non-bound 
Mean 
Bound 
Variance 
Non-bound 
Variance 
 Bound 
Mean 
Non-bound 
Mean 
Bound 
Variance 
Non-bound 
Variance 
SIZE 9.313 9.021 3.044 2.007  9.313 9.313 3.044 3.044 
LEVERAGE 0.323 0.318 0.032 0.025  0.323 0.323 0.032 0.032 
CASH FLOW 0.137 0.099 0.005 0.005  0.137 0.137 0.005 0.005 
DEBTCOV 2.503 3.209 4.167 8.705  2.503 2.502 4.167 4.167 
NEG_DEBTCOV 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.021  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INTCOV 17.269 16.886 271.766 984.667  17.269 17.268 271.766 271.804 
PROFIT 0.319 0.213 0.020 0.025  0.319 0.319 0.020 0.020 
PROFITVOL 0.035 0.028 0.001 0.001  0.035 0.035 0.001 0.001 
TANGIBILITY 0.511 0.360 0.035 0.046  0.511 0.511 0.035 0.035 
CAPEX 0.088 0.061 0.002 0.002  0.088 0.088 0.002 0.002 
RENT 0.067 0.048 0.002 0.002  0.067 0.067 0.002 0.002 
(continued) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Regression Analyses 
Variable (N=2,313) Mean Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Dependent Variables:        
FORECAST 0.237 0.425 0 0 0 0 1 
FREQUENCY 0.279 0.555 0 0 0 0 2.565 
Entropy Balanced Matching Variables: 
SIZE 9.319 1.740 5.718 7.976 9.250 10.636 12.327 
LEVERAGE 0.321 0.177 0.004 0.195 0.290 0.428 0.828 
CASH FLOW 0.137 0.069 -0.072 0.089 0.130 0.175 0.337 
DEBTCOV 2.488 2.022 0.000 1.027 1.906 3.466 20.351 
NEG_DEBTCOV 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
INTCOV 17.330 16.458 -0.861 6.939 16.306 16.306 274.676 
PROFIT 0.319 0.141 -0.066 0.209 0.325 0.413 0.784 
PROFITVOL 0.035 0.029 0.001 0.014 0.025 0.047 0.177 
TANGIBILITY 0.511 0.185 0.006 0.410 0.544 0.644 0.900 
CAPEX 0.088 0.043 0.003 0.058 0.081 0.115 0.260 
RENT 0.067 0.043 0.000 0.012 0.100 0.100 0.100 
Other Control Variables:      
BTM 1.666 4.591 -0.159 0.412 0.675 1.252 28.130 
SURPRISE 0.171 0.433 0.000 0.009 0.036 0.098 2.080 
RETVOL 0.313 0.215 0.011 0.155 0.255 0.412 1.200 
RETURN 0.079 0.418 -0.950 -0.136 0.033 0.247 2.766 
ROA 0.045 0.068 -0.244 0.013 0.045 0.085 0.262 
ACCRUALS 0.000 0.058 -0.389 -0.024 0.000 0.023 0.490 
ANALYST 11.606 10.601 0.000 2.000 8.000 18.000 40.000 
INSTOWNERSHIP 0.209 0.154 0.000 0.124 0.194 0.282 1.000 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics for the sovereign ceiling rule setting. Our sample contains a maximum of 
370 unique firms and 2,313 firm-year observations from 36 countries that experienced a sovereign rating downgrade 
during the period 2000 to 2015 listed in Panel A. The bound (non-bound) sample includes firm-years where the 
firm’s rating is equal to or above (below) the sovereign rating in the prior year, hence will be affected (unaffected) 
by rating agencies’ sovereign ceiling policies, which requires that firms’ ratings remain at or below the sovereign 
rating of their country of domicile. Panel B presents the ex-post changes in long-term credit ratings for bound (non-
bound) samples around the sovereign downgrade years. Panel C presents the ex-post changes in 5-year CDS spreads 
for bound (non-bound) samples around the sovereign downgrade years. Panel D reports the comparisons of mean 
and variance for various firm characteristics (i.e., firm-level determinants of corporate credit rating) between the 
bound and non-bound samples, pre- and post- entropy balanced matching. Panel E presents descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in the regression analyses. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the SFAS158 Setting 
Panel A: Sample Composition by Industry 
Fama-French 12 Industries Code Unique Firms Firm-Quarters 
Consumer NonDurables -- Food, Tobacco 39 615 
Consumer Durables -- Cars, TV's, Furniture 22 298 
Manufacturing -- Machinery, Trucks, Plants 107 1,535 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 29 443 
Chemicals and Allied Products 42 594 
Business Equipment -- Computers, Software 30 463 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services  31 461 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drug 23 341 
Other -- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans 23 324 
Total 346 5,074 
 
Panel B: Ex-post Changes in Credit Ratings 
 Long-term Credit Ratings 
  Pre-SFAS158 Post-SFAS158  
  (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
HIGHAML (i) 
9.81 10.00 0.19* 
N=1,982 N=659  
LOWAML (ii) 
9.99 10.45 0.46*** 
N=1,819 N=614  
 (i)-(ii) -0.18 -0.45 -0.27* 
 
    
 % (Count) Of firms that experienced credit ratings changes in the year 2007 
  # Upgrades # No Change # Downgrades 
  (a) (b) (c) 
HIGHAML (i) 
28.4% 42.0% 29.5% 
N=50 N=74 N=52 
LOWAML (ii) 
22.9% 41.8% 35.3% 
N=39 N=71 N=60 
      
(continued) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel C: Ex-post Changes in CDS Spreads (Unweighted) 
 5-Year CDS Spreads 
  Pre-SFAS158 Post-SFAS158  
  (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
HIGHAML (i) 
1.03 1.03 0.00 
N=1,181 N=414  
LOWAML (ii) 
0.99 1.02 0.03 
N=1,088 N=374  
 (i)-(ii) -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
     
 
    
Panel D: Entropy Balanced Matching  
 Pre-Matching  Post-Matching 
 HIGHAML Mean 
LOWAML 
Mean 
HIGHAML 
Variance 
LOWAML 
Variance 
 HIGHAML 
Mean 
LOWAML 
Mean 
HIGHAML 
Variance 
LOWAML 
Variance 
SIZE 8.369 8.453 1.636 1.509  8.369 8.369 1.636 1.637 
LEVERAGE 0.276 0.287 0.025 0.026  0.276 0.276 0.025 0.025 
CASH FLOW 0.024 0.025 0.001 0.001  0.024 0.024 0.001 0.001 
DEBTCOV 15.900 17.492 600.067 701.590  15.900 15.899 600.067 600.043 
NEG_DEBTCOV 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.010  0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
INTCOV 0.137 0.174 0.007 0.023  0.137 0.137 0.007 0.007 
PROFIT 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.000  0.008 0.008 0.000 0.000 
PROFITVOL 15.314 14.245 760.204 558.564  15.314 15.314 760.204 760.212 
TANGIBILITY 0.276 0.311 0.025 0.049  0.276 0.276 0.025 0.025 
CAPEX 0.011 0.013 0.000 0.000  0.011 0.011 0.000 0.000 
RENT 0.014 0.015 0.000 0.000  0.014 0.014 0.000 0.000 
(continued) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Regression Analyses 
Variable (N=5,074) Mean Std. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Dependent Variables:        
FORECAST 0.546 0.498 0 0 1 1 1 
FREQUENCY 0.602 0.623 0 0 0.693 1.099 2.079 
Entropy Balanced Matching Variables: 
SIZE 8.418 1.253 5.566 7.562 8.315 9.297 11.902 
LEVERAGE 0.281 0.16 0 0.178 0.262 0.363 0.916 
CASH FLOW 0.024 0.028 -0.149 0.008 0.024 0.039 0.125 
DEBTCOV 16.697 25.552 0 4.55 7.995 14.73 102.438 
NEG_DEBTCOV 0.013 0.112 0 0 0 0 1 
INTCOV 14.84 25.84 -4.745 4.707 9.216 15.619 220.542 
PROFIT 0.155 0.124 -0.226 0.083 0.135 0.195 0.709 
PROFITVOL 0.009 0.013 0 0.002 0.005 0.011 0.137 
TANGIBILITY 0.293 0.192 0 0.146 0.242 0.399 0.901 
CAPEX 0.012 0.011 0 0.005 0.009 0.015 0.084 
RENT 0.015 0.02 0 0.006 0.009 0.016 0.169 
PENSIONSIZE 0.15 0.164 0 0.037 0.100 0.200 0.802 
Control Variables:        
BTM 0.438 0.313 -0.708 0.255 0.403 0.579 2.385 
SURPRISE 0.011 0.034 0 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.322 
RETVOL 0.12 0.072 0 0.074 0.105 0.147 0.665 
RETURN 0.041 0.153 -0.786 -0.046 0.039 0.124 1.592 
ROA 0.013 0.021 -0.419 0.006 0.014 0.022 0.07 
ACCRUALS 0.088 0.144 -0.489 0 0.056 0.151 0.844 
ANALYST 10.016 6.549 0 5 9 14 38 
INSTOWNERSHIP 0.714 0.295 0 0.641 0.794 0.897 1 
 
The table presents descriptive statistics for the SFAS158 setting. Our sample contains a maximum of 346 unique U.S. 
firms and 5,074 firm-quarter observations during the period 2004 to 2007. Panel A presents the breakdown of the 
sample based on industry classification in fiscal year 2005. Panel B presents the ex-post changes in long-term credit 
ratings for the high AML and low AML samples around SFAS158 implementation. HIGHAML (LOWAML) is an 
indicator variable set to one for firms where the size of the firm’s Additional Minimum Liability adjustment pre-
SFAS158 is above (below) the sample median (see Basu and Naughton, 2017). We transform the categorical long-term 
credit ratings in to a continuous measure where higher value represents lower ratings. Panel C presents the ex-post 
changes in 5-year CDS spreads for the high (low) AML samples around SFAS158 implementation. Panel D reports the 
comparisons of mean and variance for various firm characteristics (i.e., firm-level determinants of corporate credit 
rating) between the treatment and control firms, pre- and post- entropy balanced matching. Panel E presents descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 3: Changes in Voluntary Disclosure Behavior around Sovereign Rating Downgrades 
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Management Forecasts  
 Management Forecast 
  Non-Downgrade Years Downgrade Years  
  (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
Bound  (i) 
0.134 0.314 0.180*** 
N=67 N=35  
Non-bound (ii) 
0.287 0.236 -0.051 
N=1,861 N=350  
 (i)-(ii) -0.153** 0.078 0.231*** 
 
    
 Forecast Frequency 
  Non-Downgrade Years Downgrade Years  
  (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
Bound (i) 
0.147 0.424 0.277*** 
N=67 N=35  
Non-bound (ii) 
0.325 0.270 -0.055 
N=1,861 N=350  
  (i)-(ii) -0.178** 0.154 0.332*** 
(continued) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B: Regression Analysis of Management Forecasts around Sovereign Rating Downgrades 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
           
BOUND*DOWNGRADE 0.182** 0.221** 0.157 0.173* 0.452** 0.561** 
 (2.245) (2.514) (1.626) (1.708) (2.376) (2.354) 
BOUND -0.009 0.044 0.075 0.111 -0.065 -0.127 
 (0.141) (0.505) (0.456) (0.527) (0.412) (0.674) 
DOWNGRADE -0.010 0.029 0.010 0.060 -0.057 -0.020 
 (0.217) (0.444) (0.205) (0.831) (0.603) (0.159) 
Entropy Balanced Matching Variables:      
SIZE 0.051*** 0.066*** -0.047 0.004 0.093** 0.132** 
 (2.936) (2.879) (0.502) (0.042) (2.086) (2.298) 
LEVERAGE -0.031 0.053 0.215 0.464 0.252 0.166 
 (0.187) (0.193) (0.760) (1.054) (0.871) (0.579) 
CASHFLOW -0.119 -0.418 -0.251 -1.253 -0.434 -0.288 
 (0.194) (0.413) (0.333) (1.014) (0.581) (0.350) 
DEBTCOV -0.016 -0.030 -0.048* -0.075* -0.022 -0.015 
 (0.894) (0.891) (1.889) (1.724) (1.083) (0.649) 
NEG_DEBTCOV 0.052 0.029 0.156 0.241 -0.147 -0.172 
 (0.295) (0.104) (0.449) (0.469) (0.494) (0.547) 
INTCOV 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.002 
 (0.604) (0.856) (0.929) (1.256) (0.922) (0.811) 
PROFIT -0.096 -0.080 0.257 0.500 -0.411 -0.584* 
 (0.612) (0.321) (0.660) (1.106) (1.434) (1.660) 
PROFITVOL 0.677 0.240 1.360 1.383 0.161 0.599 
 (1.100) (0.362) (1.388) (1.100) (0.129) (0.462) 
TANGIBILITY 0.078 0.005 0.491* 0.621** 0.115 -0.006 
 (0.705) (0.029) (1.727) (2.111) (0.522) (0.021) 
CAPEX -0.231 -0.172 -0.369 0.194 0.371 0.966 
 (0.537) (0.296) (0.508) (0.276) (0.441) (1.273) 
RENT -0.471 -0.212 0.851 1.137 -0.619 -0.696 
 (0.866) (0.248) (0.867) (0.790) (1.266) (1.033) 
Other Control Variables:       
BTM 0.004 0.003 0.020* 0.027** -0.014* -0.014 
 (0.438) (0.305) (1.728) (2.308) (1.896) (1.441) 
SURPRISE 0.100 0.129* 0.043 0.056 0.218** 0.195 
 (1.534) (1.880) (0.717) (0.969) (2.134) (1.410) 
RETVOL 0.023 -0.051 0.086 -0.008 -0.088 -0.165 
 (0.204) (0.395) (0.551) (0.048) (0.645) (0.965) 
RETURN -0.028 -0.013 -0.058 -0.023 0.039 0.098 
 (0.850) (0.261) (1.302) (0.374) (0.601) (0.980) 
ROA -0.132 -0.158 -0.496 -0.370 -0.707 -1.055* 
 (0.353) (0.343) (0.838) (0.493) (1.638) (1.834) 
ACCRUALS 0.357 0.088 0.309 0.054 1.149 1.302 
 (1.372) (0.293) (1.026) (0.167) (1.575) (1.330) 
ANALYST 0.006* 0.008 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (1.687) (1.654) (0.376) (0.144) (0.173) (0.060) 
INSTOWNERSHIP 0.009 0.000 0.198 0.001 0.062 0.232 
 (0.087) (0.002) (0.812) (0.004) (0.139) (0.520) 
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Firm Fixed Effects - - Yes Yes - - 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - - - 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - - - 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes - - 
Country-Industry-Year Fixed 
Effects No No - - Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.345 0.344 0.428 0.467 0.764 0.828 
Number of Firm-Years 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 
 
The table reports analyses of changes in firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior following sovereign rating downgrade. 
Panel A reports the mean values of the voluntary disclosure behavior variables across bound and non-bound firm-
years, in the downgrade year and outside of the downgrade year. We indicate statistical significance of differences 
across cells with t-tests. Panel B reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust 
standard errors clustered by country-industry. BOUND is an indicator variable set to one for firm-years where the 
firm’s rating is equal to or above the sovereign rating in the prior year. DOWNGRADE is an indicator variable set to 
one for country-years where the country experiences a sovereign rating downgrade. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. We include firm-, country-, industry-and year-fixed effects in the regressions as indicated, but do not 
report the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% p-levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Changes in Voluntary Disclosure Behavior around SFAS158 
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Management Forecasts around SFAS158 
 Management Forecast 
  Pre-SFAS158 Post-SFAS158  
  (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
HIGHAML (i) 
0.586 0.539 -0.047** 
N=1,982 N=659  
LOWAML (ii) 
0.518 0.551 0.033 
N=1,819 N=614  
 (i)-(ii) 0.068 -0.012 -0.080*** 
 
    
 Forecast Frequency 
  Pre-SFAS158 Post-SFAS158  
  (a) (b) (b)-(a) 
HIGHAML (i) 
0.681 0.542 -0.139*** 
N=1,982 N=659  
LOWAML (ii) 
0.573 0.548 -0.025 
N=1,819 N=614  
  (i)-(ii) 0.108* -0.006 -0.164*** 
(continued) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel B: Regression Analysis of Management Forecasts around SFAS158 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 
Management  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Management  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
         
HIGHAML*POST -0.116*** -0.161*** -0.074*** -0.103*** 
 (3.990) (4.161) (2.801) (2.920) 
HIGHAML 0.044 0.080   
 (0.881) (1.255)   
Entropy Balanced Matching Variables:     
SIZE 0.001 0.029 0.042 0.052 
 (0.040) (1.244) (1.193) (0.777) 
LEVERAGE -0.052 -0.035 -0.169* -0.344** 
 (0.408) (0.224) (1.748) (2.498) 
CASH FLOW 0.894*** 1.484*** 0.308* 0.578** 
 (2.613) (3.353) (1.766) (2.371) 
DEBTCOV -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.868) (0.219) (0.236) (1.108) 
NEG_DEBTCOV -0.012 0.059 0.075 0.140* 
 (0.142) (0.579) (1.222) (1.861) 
INTCOV -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** 
 (1.058) (2.863) (2.006) (2.847) 
PROFIT 0.152 0.368 0.069 0.150 
 (0.561) (1.079) (0.398) (0.700) 
PROFITVOL -5.420*** -6.802*** -0.431 -1.042 
 (4.173) (4.308) (0.595) (1.220) 
TANGIBILITY -0.488*** -0.545*** -0.288 -0.511** 
 (3.352) (3.054) (1.586) (2.200) 
CAPEX 1.528 2.585 1.317 2.076 
 (0.584) (0.835) (1.214) (1.529) 
RENT 2.164** 3.196** -3.181* -5.024** 
 (2.379) (2.318) (1.650) (2.023) 
Other Control Variables:     
BTM -0.025 -0.038 -0.020 -0.033 
 (0.462) (0.604) (0.382) (0.527) 
SURPRISE -0.549 -0.660 -0.584* -0.871* 
 (1.397) (1.460) (1.805) (1.879) 
RETVOL -0.945*** -0.936*** -0.136 -0.002 
 (4.969) (4.157) (0.927) (0.010) 
RETURN -0.075 -0.120** -0.069* -0.117** 
 (1.503) (1.998) (1.717) (2.377) 
ROA 0.843 1.121 0.523 0.779* 
 (1.444) (1.498) (1.309) (1.689) 
ACCRUALS -0.108 -0.145 0.033 0.046 
 (0.980) (1.005) (0.590) (0.561) 
ANALYST 0.009** 0.010** 0.008* 0.012* 
 (2.474) (2.030) (1.832) (1.729) 
INSTOWNERSHIP 0.266*** 0.332*** -0.180** -0.215* 
 (3.697) (3.993) (1.994) (1.908) 
PENSION ASSETS 0.062 0.075 -0.190 -0.216 
 (0.417) (0.368) (0.736) (0.753) 
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Firm Fixed Effects - - Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.203 0.201 0.694 0.681 
Number of Firm-Years 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 
 
The table reports analyses of changes in firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior following SFAS158 implementation. 
Panel A reports the mean values of the voluntary disclosure behavior variables across the high AML and low AML 
firms, pre and post SFAS158.  HIGHAML (LOWAML) is an indicator variable set to one for firms where the size of 
the firm’s Additional Minimum Liability adjustment pre-SFAS158 is above (below) the sample median (see Basu and 
Naughton, 2017). We indicate statistical significance of differences across cells with t-tests. Panel B reports OLS 
coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. Post is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one for fiscal-quarters ending during calendar year 2007 (i.e., post SFAS158 
implementation). All variables are defined in Appendix A. We include firm-, industry-, quarter- and year-fixed effects 
in the regressions as indicated, but do not report the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% p-levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5: Cross-Sectional Analyses of the Changes in Voluntary Disclosure  
Panel A: Sovereign Rating Downgrades Setting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
            
BOUND  0.357*** 0.281*** 0.352*** 0.278*** 1.552*** 2.185*** 
   *DOWNGRADE*SMALL (3.790) (2.618) (3.140) (2.616) (6.206) (6.487) 
BOUND  0.062 0.183 0.013 0.092 0.639*** 0.755*** 
   *DOWNGRADE*BIG (0.696) (1.564) (0.128) (0.748) (3.092) (2.765) 
       
F-test for Differences across  
   Coefficients [p-value] [0.009] [0.510] [0.013] [0.174] [0.000] [0.000] 
Main Effects, 2-way 
Interaction, Matching and 
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Fixed Effects - - Yes Yes - - 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - - - 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - - - 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes - - 
Country-Industry-Year F.E. - - - - Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.345 0.339 0.446 0.474 0.777 0.841 
Number of Firm-Years 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 
 
Panel B: SFAS158 Implementation Setting 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 
Management  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Management  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
         
HIGHAML*POST*SMALL -0.098** -0.119** -0.146*** -0.186*** 
 (2.499) (2.444) (3.267) (3.537) 
HIGHAML*POST*BIG -0.053 -0.088* -0.080** -0.132** 
 (1.486) (1.712) (2.175) (2.437) 
F-test for Differences across  
   Coefficients [p-value] [0.409] [0.664] [0.253] [0.461] 
Main Effects, 2-way Interaction,  
   Matching and Control Variables Included Included Included Included 
Firm Fixed Effects - - Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.693 0.681 0.209 0.207 
Number of Firm-Years 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 
  
The table presents cross-sectional analyses of changes in firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior following a sovereign 
rating downgrade (Panel A) and around SFAS158 implementation (Panel B). In both panels, we use total market cap 
to proxy for the firms’ information environment. SMALL (BIG) indicates firm-years with total market cap below 
(above) the sample median. The panels only report the OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics of 
the main variables of interest but include all the main effects, 2-way interaction terms and the full set of matching 
variables, controls and fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. We use robust standard errors clustered 
by country-industry (Panel A) and firm (Panel B). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% p-levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 6: Additional Analyses of the Changes in Voluntary Disclosure around Sovereign Rating Downgrades 
Panel A: Partition based on Free Cash Flow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
            
BOUND  0.307** 0.489** 0.301** 0.468* 1.169*** 1.553*** 
   *DOWNGRADE*LOWFCF (2.341) (2.044) (2.034) (1.859) (2.891) (2.940) 
BOUND  0.133 0.143 0.099 0.097 0.275 0.307 
   *DOWNGRADE*HIGHFCF (1.026) (0.922) (0.648) (0.549) (1.088) (0.948) 
       
F-test for Differences across  
   Coefficients [p-value] [0.418] [0.310] [0.417] [0.305] [0.001] [0.001] 
Main Effects, 2-way Interaction, 
Matching and Control    
Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Fixed Effects - - Yes Yes - - 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - - - 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - - - 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes - - 
Country-Industry-Year F.E. - - - - Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.353 0.384 0.435 0.507 0.777 0.842 
Number of Firm-Years 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 
 
Panel B: Partition based on the KZ Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
Mgmt.  
Forecast 
Forecast 
Frequency 
            
BOUND  0.339*** 0.306** 0.330** 0.251 0.469** 0.584** 
   *DOWNGRADE*HIGHKZ (2.944) (2.182) (2.471) (1.532) (2.267) (2.354) 
BOUND  -0.024 0.065 -0.061 0.025 0.317 0.512 
   *DOWNGRADE*LOWKZ (0.272) (0.598) (0.564) (0.204) (1.519) (1.384) 
       
F-test for Differences across  
   Coefficients [p-value] [0.009] [0.162] [0.020] [0.261] [0.440] [0.821] 
Main Effects, 2-way Interaction, 
Matching and Control    
Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Fixed Effects - - Yes Yes - - 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - - - 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes - - - - 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes - - 
Country-Industry-Year F.E.  - - - - Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.359 0.354 0.438 0.472 0.770 0.831 
Number of Firm-Years 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313 
(continued) 
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Table 6 (continued) 
The table presents cross-sectional analyses of changes in firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior following a sovereign 
rating downgrade based on two proxies of financial constraints. In Panel A, we divide the firm-years based on the 
level of free cash flows (operating cash flows less capital expenditures scaled by total assets) for the year prior to the 
sovereign rating downgrades. LOWFCF (HIGHFCF) indicates firm-years with free cash flows below (above) the 
sample median. In Panel B, we divide the firm-years based on the KZ index for the year prior to the sovereign rating 
downgrades. The KZ index is calculated based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997). HIGHKZ (LOWKZ) indicates firm-
years with KZ index above (below) the sample median. The panels only report the OLS coefficient estimates and (in 
parentheses) t-statistics of the main variables of interest but include all the main effects, 2-way interaction terms and 
the full set of matching variables, controls and fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix A. We use robust 
standard errors clustered by country-industry. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
p-levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
 
 
